Fingerprinting schemes support copyright protection by enabling the merchant of a data item to identify the original buyer of a redistributed copy. In asymmetric schemes, the merchant can also convince an arbiter of this fact. Anonymous fingerprinting schemes enable buyers to purchase digital items anonymously; however, identification is possible if they redistribute the data item.
Introduction
Protection of intellectual property in digital form has been a subject of research for many years and led to the development of various techniques. Fingerprinting schemes are an important class of these techniques. They are cryptographic methods applied to deter people from redistributing a data item by enabling the original merchant to trace a copy back to its original buyer. Dishonest buyers who redistribute the data item illegally are called traitors. The identifying information, called fingerprint, is embedded into copies of the original data item. The underlying watermarking techniques should guarantee that the embedded fingerprints are imperceptible and resistant to data manipulation as long as a traitor only uses one copy.
The first enhancement is the addition of collusion tolerance [BMP86, BS95, CKLS96] , i.e., resistance even if traitors compare up to a certain number of different copies. A second addition is asymmetry [PS96a, PW97a, BM97] ; here the merchant finds an actual proof of the treachery in a redistributed copy, i.e., some data (similar to a signature "I redistributed") that only the identified buyer could have computed. The third addition is anonymity where buyers can stay anonymous in purchasing a fingerprinted data item. Only if they redistribute the data item, the identity is revealed. We mean anonymity in the strong sense of the original definition in [PW97b] , i.e., any coalition of merchants, central parties and other buyers should not be able to distinguish purchases of the remaining buyers. A weak form can easily be achieved by using any asymmetric fingerprinting scheme under a certified pseudonym instead of a real identity. In the context of fingerprinting a distinction can be made whether one fingerprints the actual data item or a key for decrypting it. The latter, introduced in [CFN94] , is typically called "traitor tracing." Here we deal with anonymous asymmetric data fingerprinting with collusion tolerance. 1 Anonymous fingerprinting was introduced in [PW97b] , but only a construction using general theorems like "every NP-language has a zero-knowledge proof system" was presented there. In [PS99] , an explicit construction based on digital coins was shown. It is fairly efficient in the sense that all operations are efficient computations with modular multiplications and exponentiations; however, at least in the collusion-tolerant case, the code needed for embedding is so long that the overall system can not be called practical.
A remaining problem with the coin-based construction is that it does not offer direct non-repudiation, i.e., in the case of a dispute, the accused buyer has to participate in the trial to deny the charges if possible. Direct non-repudiation, where the merchant alone has enough information to convince any arbiter, is more useful in real life. This is obviously true when the buyer is not reachable. But it holds even if the accused buyer has to be found in any case for reasons outside the cryptographic system, e.g., for punishment, or simply because real-life trials require the accused person to be notified. The buyer could rightly or wrongly claim to have lost the information needed for the trial or the password to it, or it could occur that a dissolved company did not leave such information to its legal successors. The difference is similar to that between normal digital signatures (direct non-repudiation) and undeniable signatures [CA90] (signer needed in trial).
In this paper, we remedy this problem. The new construction is coin-based again and equally efficient as the previous one. The new part is based on methods from coin tracing, concretely [FTY96] , in particular a technique we call delayed verifiable encryption. However, on the one hand the similarity is only at the technical level: recall that we do not require a trusted third party, otherwise we could use the simple solution mentioned above. On the other hand, we need a closer binding between this encryption and the coin than in coin tracing to provide an unforgeable link to the license conditions.
Overview of the Model and Coin-Based Fingerprinting
In this section, we briefly review the model of anonymous fingerprinting from [PW97b] . Then we recall the basic ideas of coin-based fingerprinting from [PS99] and why indirect non-repudiation was needed so far. This serves as a basis for the overview of the improved construction in the following section.
Model
Anonymous fingerprinting involves merchants, buyers, registration centers and arbiters, denoted by M, B, RC and A, respectively. We assume that buyers can already digitally sign under their "real" identity ID B , i.e., that corresponding public keys pk B have been distributed. Before the buyers can purchase fingerprinted data items, they must register with a registration center RC. Registration centers will enjoy the minimum possible trust, i.e., the most a dishonest RC can do is to refuse a registration. 2 An arbiter A represents an arbitrary honest party who should be convinced by a proof.
The four main protocols of an anonymous fingerprinting scheme are registration, fingerprinting, identification, and trial. Besides, there are three protocols for registration center key distribution, where RC distributes specific parameters, data initialization, which a merchant carries out before the first sale of a specific data item, and enforced identification for the case where a merchant claims towards an arbiter that RC refuses to cooperate in identification.
1 Omitting the collusion tolerance automatically makes the schemes significantly more efficient.
2 One may ask why RC is then needed, e.g., whether the merchants could not play this untrusted role themselves. However, buyers will only be anonymous among all people registered at the same registration center, and corresponding groups per merchant could be too small for meaningful anonymity.
The main security requirements are the following (for more details, see [PW97b] and our section on security):
1. An honest merchant must be able to identify a traitor and win in the corresponding trial for every illegally redistributed copy of the data item he finds, unless the collusion is larger than the tolerated limit. The identified traitor may be RC, in particular if it wrongly refuses identification.
Moreover, even if there are more traitors, the merchant may want to be protected from damaging his reputation by making accusations and losing the trial. Hence it is required that if identification succeeds at all, he should also win the trial.
2. No honest buyer B or honest RC should be found guilty by an honest arbiter, not even if there are more traitors than the limit used in the security of the merchant. In particular, as some redistributions may be legal, a proof of redistribution must be unambiguously linked to a value text used during fingerprinting and typically designating the terms and conditions.
3. Purchases of honest buyers should not be linkable even by a collusion of all merchants, RC, and other buyers.
General Ideas of Coin-Based Fingerprinting
The basic idea for using digital cash systems with double-spender identification to construct an anonymous fingerprinting scheme is as follows: Registration corresponds to withdrawing a coin. (The "coins" only serve as a cryptographic primitive and have no monetary value.) During fingerprinting, the coin is given to the merchant, and in principle a first payment with the coin is made. 3 So far, the untraceability of the cash system should guarantee that the views of the registration center and the merchant are unlinkable. Then a second payment with the same coin is started. Now, instead of giving the buyer's response to the merchant, it is embedded in the data item. This embedding must be both secret and verifiable. After a redistribution, the merchant can extract the second response from the data item and carry out double-spender identification.
Apart from the efficient secret and verifiable embedding of the second payment response in the data, the main problem is the unambiguous link to a text describing the terms and conditions of the purchase that we required. Recall that in cash systems, double-spender identification has no such properties: the merchant simply obtains one fixed value i, called identity proof, independent of which coins were doublespent and how often.
The first idea was to sign the text with a secret key whose corresponding public key pk text is included in the coin. However, the registration center, as the signer of the coins, can forge coins even in such a way that they can be linked to a certain withdrawal (where the buyer may have signed the withdrawal data). Hence the real problem is how to show that the particular coin with pk text is in fact one that the accused buyer has withdrawn.
In [PS99] , the solution idea was to allow the buyer to repudiate an accusation with a wrong coin by presenting a different coin and the blinding elements that link it to the specific withdrawal from which this coin is supposed to come. For the case of Brands' payment system, this was shown to be secure under a slightly stronger restrictiveness assumption than what would be needed for the pure payment system. Instead, we now want to give the merchant a direct proof that does not involve the buyer.
Ideas for Achieving Direct Non-Repudiation
In this section we give an informal overview of the new construction with direct non-repudiation, i.e., where the merchant can convince an arbiter without participation by the accused buyer. As described in Section 2.2, we want to fix the actual terms and conditions text by signing them with respect to a key pk text contained in the coin, and it remains to link this key unforgeably to a particular buyer after a redistribution.
The basic idea is to encrypt this coin key pk text during registration, and such that the identity proof i is the secret key needed for decryption. The buyer must sign this encryption enc under his real identity so that he is bound to it. Hence, once the merchant learns i due to a redistribution, it is possible to decrypt enc and verify which coin key pk text the buyer planned to use. Note that the buyer is not needed in this step; this is essential for the direct non-repudiation.
Each i is only used for one coin so that the link between the particular coin and the corresponding encryption enc will be clear.
The Brands' system have been used several times in the past, e.g., in [Bra93, BGK95, FTY98] .) Restrictiveness of the blind signature scheme, together with proofs of knowledge that the values are formed over the correct generators, guarantees that a buyer cannot decompose the product in two non-corresponding ways at both sides.
Here is also where the specific restrictiveness assumption comes in: The security of RC relies on the correct decomposition, and RC cannot trust the merchants to verify zero-knowledge proofs in fingerprinting correctly. Hence one aspect of the decomposition, (the fact that the buyer knows the discrete logarithm of pk text over the correct generator), is only substantiated by a Schnorr signature towards RC. In our setting, even in the random oracle model we cannot easily define and prove this Schnorr signature to be a non-interactive proof of knowledge for lack of an initial common input (see Section 5.2). Hence we have to accommodate for this immediately in the restrictiveness assumption, see Section 5.2. We believe that certain statements in papers on related coin systems must be formalized in the same way.
Construction
We now present the new construction step by step. There are no surprises given the informal description in the previous section. However, as there are no modular definitions for most components we use, and as we modify some of them internally, a concrete description of the overall system seems to be the easiest way to make everything precise and to get security proofs.
For simplicity, we assume that there is only one registration center.
Once and for all, a group G q from a family of groups of prime order and generators g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 2 R G q n f1g are selected. For concreteness, assume that G q is the unique subgroup of order q of the multiplicative group Z p , where p is another prime with qj(p ? 1). Even RC, who will typically make this choice, should not be able to compute discrete logarithms in G q , and the generators must be truly random. 4 Hash functions hash and hash 0 for the underlying protocols (Brands and Schnorr signatures) must also be fixed. Finally, RC generates a secret signing key x 2 R Z q and publishes the public key h g x mod p.
Registration
An overview of the registration protocol is given in Figures 1 and 2 . In the following, we relate the figures to the informal description and explain the correctness proof. Figure 1: The registration protocol before the blind signature 1. Opening a one-time account. B chooses the "identity proof" i 2 R Z q randomly and secretly and computes h 1 g i 1 (with h 1 g 2 6 = 1), the "account number" from Brands' system, and h 3 g i 3 , which we introduced specially as a public key for ElGamal encryption.
Coin key and encryption.
The value k, also selected secretly and randomly by B, serves as the secret coin key and pk text g k 4 mod p as the corresponding public key. B ElGamal-encrypts this public coin key into a ciphertext enc using h 3 as the public key. She computes a signature sig coin sig pk B (h 1 ; h 3 ; enc) under her normal identity and sends it to RC, who verifies it. This signature later shows that B is responsible for this "account" identified by the keys h 1 and h 3 and for the public key encrypted in enc. 3. Encoding for delayed verifiable encryption. The pair (M 1 ; M 2 ) = (g j 3 ; pk j text ) is the additional encoding of pk text whose content is invariant under the following blinding operation. RC will verify that M 1 6 = 1. The content is uniquely defined because M 1 6 = 1 uniquely defines j 6 = 0, and then M 2 and j uniquely define pk text .
Correctness proofs
Now B sends the public values to RC and gives certain correctness proofs. Intuitively, this is in particular that h 1 and h 3 contain the same identity proof i, and that the content of the encryption (which is uniquely defined given h 3 ) equals the content of the pair (M 1 ; M 2 ) as defined above.
Formally, B has to give a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the values i; j; k; y such that the public values, i.e., h 1 ; h 3 ; enc; M 1 ; M 2 fulfill the prescribed equations. This can be done by using a simple protocol from [CEG88] for i and the specific "indirect discourse proof" from [FTY96] for the remaining parameters. However, there is also a general efficient technique for proving low-degree polynomial relations in exponents [Cam98] , Section 3.5, which comprises this and many similar situations. For ease of the reader, the protocol from [CEG88] to get back to the linear situation.).
5.
Withdrawal. Now RC gives a blind signature on the combination of a coin and the encoding (M 1 ; M 2 ).
Let m g i 1 g 2 = h 1 g 2 be the value typically signed in Brands' scheme), M M 1 M 2 , and N mM. This N is the common input to the blind signing protocol (essentially from [CP93] ). In [Bra94] , an additional value is included in the hashing; we use pk text in that place. The resulting protocol is shown in Figure 2 . 
Fingerprinting
The main common input in fingerprinting is the value text typically used to refer to the license conditions. We assume that each text is fresh for both buyer and merchant in this protocol, i.e., neither of them uses a value text twice. This can be achieved by a number of standard techniques. and verifiably in the data item. This is the identical task as in [PS99] and thus from here on we can reuse the old protocol.
For the overall security considerations later, note that in this protocol, additional commitments on (is; s)
are made. These are information-theoretically hiding discrete-logarithm commitments using generators chosen by the merchant and quadratic-residue commitments with respect to a number n chosen by the buyer specially for this embedding. The rest are zero-knowledge protocols. Finally, the buyer decrypts quadraticresidue commitments provided by the merchant with respect to the buyer's n. 
Enforced Identification
If M has to enforce the cooperation of RC, 
Security
In this section we present detailed proof sketches for the security of the construction. Hereby we rely on the definitions and requirements security outlined in [PW97b] . The first requirements from [PW97b] are effectiveness and "no jamming by registration center". The former means that the registration and fingerprinting succeed if all parties behave correctly. The latter means that even if RC is dishonest, B will convince any honest merchant in fingerprinting, if she has accepted the corresponding registration. Both cases are straightforward to verify for our scheme. Hence we immediately proceed with the main security requirements.
Security for the Buyer
The buyer's security requirement can be formulated as follows: Consider a buyer B who correctly follows the protocols and keeps the obtained results secret, in particular the data item bought. No matter what the 6 This is necessary for the security of RC by guaranteeing that the division of N 0 into m 0 and M 0 is correct, even if RC is supposed to identify all redistributors independent of text . 7 The latter verification is not essential, but otherwise M must include M 0 in proof . other parties do, the output of the trial with an honest arbiter will not declare this buyer guilty. Even in the case of legal redistribution, where the adversary can obtain fingerprinted data items from B for certain texts, the honest buyer cannot be found guilty of illegal redistribution, i.e., of redistribution for other texts.
Hence consider a trial with B for a specific text text for which B has not redistributed the data item.
Step 2 of the trial guarantees that B is only held responsible for one of his own one-time account numbers h 1 g i 1 , and that the adversaries must know i.
First, we show that the adversary cannot find i unless it obtains the result of a purchase where B has used a coin coin 0 withdrawn from the account h 1 . The only knowledge the adversary can otherwise obtain about i is: (1) h 1 and h 3 , (2) the correctness proof in registration, (3) the proof of knowledge of a representation of m 0 with respect to (g 1 ; g 2 ) in fingerprinting, and (4) the commitments on emb = (is; s) and some zeroknowledge proofs in the embedding step. (Note that the decryptions the buyer makes cannot be used as an oracle here because the results only become known to the adversary in a redistribution.) In all the other steps, e.g., the ElGamal encryption, the buyer only uses values that are already known, like h 3 . As the proofs are zero-knowledge and the commitments semantically secure, computing i from all this information is as hard as computing it from h 1 and h 3 alone. This is as hard as the discrete logarithm. 8 Hence the only way for the adversary to find i is in fact to obtain the resulting data item in a purchase where B has used coin 0 based on h 1 . Let text be the text used in that purchase. By the precondition, we know that text 6 = text. The secret key k corresponding to pk text in coin 0 is known only to B. The only information B gives about k are zero-knowledge proofs in registration and fingerprinting and the signature on text . If the signature scheme is secure against active attacks, this does not help the adversary to forge a valid signature with respect to pk text on text.
Finally, the signature sig coin fixes the encryption enc and the public key h 3 to be used with the account number h 1 , and enc and h 3 together uniquely fix pk text . The arbiter verifies this in the trial. Thus the adversary cannot use any other pk 0 text to sign text with respect to h 1 .
Security for the Registration Center
We have to show that if the registration center is honest, an honest arbiter will never output that RC is guilty.
We need the restrictiveness of the underlying blind signature scheme for showing that the value m 0 used in fingerprinting "contains" the same value i as the original m, and also that the delayed verification of pk text works. In [Bra94] , Brands only works with two generators g 1 ; g 2 , while we use four. However, in the underlying report [Bra93] the same assumptions are made and heuristically explained for any number of generators g 1 ; : : : ; g n , and coin systems with more than two generators have also been presented in [BGK95, FTY98] . The exact assumption we need is the following: Figure 2 several The intuitive idea why this should be secure is that a Schnorr signature should be a non-interactive proof of the knowledge of the secret key. Such arguments are mentioned, e.g., in [Bra94] (Corollary 9) and [FTY96, FTY98] . However, really trying to prove our assumption from the simpler one, even in the random oracle model, leads to problems. First, the given situation does not fall under the most obvious way to define Schnorr signatures to be non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs in the random oracle model: One would take g; h as common inputs and an extractor, allowed to simulate the random oracle (in a way indistinguishable for the adversary) would have to extract the secret x with h = g x . Under this definition, it is easy to prove that Schnorr signatures are proofs of knowledge. However, in our situation and many others where a non-interactive proof is needed, h is not a common input, but chosen by the adversary in the same step as the signature serving as proof. Hence as to definitions, it is not clear what x the extractor should extract-simply producing pairs (x; h) with h = g x is trivial. The definition must therefore be made with respect to a scenario, i.e., in a joint probability space together with other variables. We can, e.g., define that the extractor must output pairs (x; h) where h has the same joint distribution with the other variables as the values h output by the adversary. Now, if the scenario is non-interactive, one can still prove the desired theorem by using the forking lemma from [PS96b] if one includes h into the hashing in the Schnorr signature. However, in our scenario the adversary interacts with the bank as blind signer, in addition to the random oracle. This gives the same problems with exponential rewinding as in [PS96c] and [SG98] , Section 2.4. It may be interesting to investigate how to modify either the proof techniques or the scheme so that some proof of this type goes through, but for the moment we had to make the stronger assumption.
Assumption 1 (Restrictiveness with Schnorr signature). Let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary that can interact with a Brands signer as in
Proof. Recall that we want to prove that an honest RC should never be found guilty by an honest A. In our scheme, this could only happen in enforced identification, because in a trial A only finds either B or M guilty. There are two ways how this could happen: Furthermore, the registration protocol guarantees that the adversary has to prove knowledge of a representation of each common input N for which the blind signature protocol is executed. These are normal interactive proofs of knowledge; hence from any adversary successful in our scenario we can, together with the extractors, construct another adversary that actually outputs the representations, so that the assumption applies to it. of how RC could be found guilty.
Security for the Merchant
The requirement for the merchant's security is as follows: For any algorithm B of the cheating buyers that engages in at most collsize (a parameter for the maximum tolerated collusion size) executions of fingerprinting for a certain data item and then produces another copy sufficiently similar to the original, the merchant will obtain a valid digital identity as an output in identification, together with a text used and a string proof , and then win a trial with any honest arbiter. This should hold even if the registration center is cheating, i.e., B also comprises it. In this case, the protocol for enforced identification may be needed if normal identification fails and the output for the arbiter in either this protocol or the trial may indicate that RC is guilty.
Just as in [PS99] , the initial extraction algorithm guarantees the following (under the given assumptions on an underlying watermarking scheme): Whenever a collusion of at the size collsize redistributes a data item sufficiently similar to the original, then M can, with very high probability, extract a value emb that belongs to a traitor. More precisely, this means that emb is a pair (r 1 ; r 2 ) such that g r Together with the values that RC must return, M therefore obtains a valid proof string proof : In a trial, A only performs verifications that M also performed in identification or fingerprinting, so that M will not lose.
M is also protected from making wrong accusations: Even if there are more than the tolerated number of traitors, M's verifications in identification guarantee that whenever he makes an accusation he will not lose in the trial.
Anonymity
We assume that RC and M collude and both may deviate from their protocols, hence we call them RC and M . We want to show that they learn nothing about the purchase behaviour of honest buyers, except for facts that can simply be derived from the knowledge of who registered and for what number of purchases, and at what time protocols are executed. This should even hold for the remaining purchases of a buyer if RC and M obtain some data items this buyer bought.
In our construction, the only information common to all registrations of a buyer is her global key pair (sk B ; pk B ) (recall that we use each i only once). She only uses it to generate the signature sig coin , and uses neither the keys nor this signature in fingerprinting. Thus other fingerprintings and possible redistributions of a buyer are statistically independent of one registration and the corresponding fingerprinting. Hence we focus on the question whether view reg and view ng from such a pair of corresponding protocols are linkable.
For this, we let an adversary carry out two registrations and then the two corresponding fingerprintings in random order. The adversary is considered successful if it can guess with probability significantly better than 1/2 which views correspond to each other: Here gen glob is an algorithm that generates the global parameters par (the group and generators in our construction), given a security parameter l. Then the two buyers generate their global keys with an algorithm gen key . Next, reg is the registration protocol. Here RC inputs the buyer's public key, the buyer B her secret key. The outputs are RC 's view and B's view view B . For the following it is useful to write RC 's view as (traf reg ; aux i ), where traf reg ("traffic" in slight abuse of the term) denotes the messages from B to RC , while the variables aux i model the adversary's entire memory between protocol executions. Now a bit b is uniformly chosen; it denotes on which registration the first execution of fingerprinting is based, assuming that the registrations succeeded from the buyers' point of view. The notation for the fingerprinting protocol ng is similar to that for reg, where '?' denotes unimportant output of B. We can prove, as shown in detail in Appendix B, that given a successful adversary as defined above, there are also successful adversaries in successive scenarios where the "buyer" sends fewer and fewer values. This finally leads to a contradiction. The anonymity of our scheme is based on the following assumption and the random oracle model for the hash function used in the blind signature protocol: 
A Proof of Knowledge of Simultaneous Discrete Logarithm
For the ease of the reader, Figure 3 shows As usual, the proofs of knowledge can either be made with small challenges and be provably zeroknowledge, or with larger challenges for greater efficiency. For discussions on non-interactive uses, see Section 5.2. The rest of our security considerations assumes that the proofs are zero-knowledge.
B Proof of Computational Anonymity
Following the definition in Section 5.4, we present a detailed proof of the anonymity of our construction. Where a simulation can be made locally for one of the four protocols, we omit the index 0 or 1 for registrations and b or b for fingerprintings. It always means that both components are simulated in the same way.
Simple simulations: We first show that some components can be omitted because they can easily be simulated from the others. For the entire views from the zero-knowledge proofs we have a simulator by definition (of auxiliary-input zero-knowledge). The triple (sk B ; pk B ; sig coin ) is not used in any other components; a simulator can therefore generate its own key pair and compute sig coin with it. traf embed consists of commitments that are information-theoretically or semantically secure (and zero-knowledge proofs). These can be simulated by commitments on fixed values; this cannot change the success probability of A Link significantly because otherwise one would obtain a distinguisher. The encryption enc is semantically secure under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption [TY98] , and thus the same argument as for the commit- For the randomness of c even for a cheating RC we work in the random oracle model for hash as in [FTY96, FTY98] . Then for each input tuple to hash that has not occurred before, the output c 0 is random and independent of all values chosen up to this time, in particular u. Furthermore, the inputs of the honest buyers contain, e.g., a new random value pk text each time and thus only repeat with negligible probability.
Hence the simulation of c is correct. Now it follows that even a cheating RC must choose (z; a; b; r) with the correct relations, i.e., such that w exists with z N x , a g w , b N w , and r cx + w. More precisely, if it chooses (z; a; b) differently, it will only pass the buyer's verification and get information on the bit b with negligible probability, 10 and hence we need not consider those cases further. This holds because one can easily extract such a w and x from acceptable responses to two challenges c 6 = c . 11 Then r is uniquely determined by the verification equation.
Given the correctness of (z; a; b; r), one can easily show that the buyer's signature 0 has the structure claimed above with w 0 = wu + v. It remains to be shown that this w 0 is uniformly distributed independent of the remaining values in the view. This is true because the only other place where u and v are used in the real protocol is in the computation of c, and we have already shown that c can be replaced by an independent random value.
Using Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions. The remaining traffics can be written as follows (we have omitted indices distinguishing the successive reduced traffics for readability): For the relation to Diffie-Hellman-type problems, where only one generator is given, we abbreviate g 1 as g (confusion with g in the withdrawal protocol should not occur) and let g 2 = g , g 3 = g , g 4 = g . Note that the generators were generated in a way that is random even if RC cheats. This is important for the following simulations, where we can use random values in the place of ; and . We now rewrite the entire remaining view of the adversary. The only points where the remaining "buyer" reacts on a message from the adversary are the signatures on texts, which we now write sig text = sig g 0 ;k (text) if g 0 is the generator and k the secret key. We include the generators so that one remembers to simulate them, and one final global memory aux of the adversary. First we show that we can replace g i 0 in traf reg;0 by an independent random value without significantly reducing the success probability of A Link . Otherwise the following algorithm would break the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption: On input (g; g x ; g y ; u), where u is either g xy or an independent random value, use the unknown values x and y in the place of and i 0 , respectively. More precisely, simulate the above view by choosing b, ; , j 0 ; k 0 ; s 0 , and i 1 ; j 1 ; k 1 ; s 1 randomly. Then compute the values where and i 0 do not occur as usual (note that this simulator knows b and thus in which fingerprinting view i 0 is used). Simulate the remaining values (these are g , g i 0 , g i 0 , g j 0 , g i 1 , g j 1 , and g i 0 s 0 + s 0 ) as g x , g y , u, (g x ) j 0 , (g x ) i 1 , (g x ) j 1 and (g y ) s 0 g s 0 . Finally, run A Link on this input, and guess "u = g xy " iff the output b equals b. If the success probability of A Link is significantly different in the case with random and correct u, the outputs of our algorithm are also significantly different in these cases and thus it is a successful distinguisher. Now we can obviously omit this independent random value and proceed in the same way for g i 1 .
Next we show that one can replace g i b s b in traf ng;b by an independent random value u. By the same technique as above, we now replace g =s 0 by an independent random value u: We use the normal DDH assumption and let x and y play the roles of and 1=s 0 . (Note that 1=s 0 modulo q is also a random number.) Again we can construct all components and they would have correct distribution in the case u = g xy . With random u, we get a component u s 0 0 , which is random and can be omitted. (Note that any u 6 = 1 is a generator.) The same holds for g =s 1 . Then g is the only remaining component with random and can be omitted. i.e., the remaining "buyer" sends nothing at all in registration. His behaviour can be simulated without even choosing a value b (it is only an index now). However, we showed that if a successful adversary in the original scenario exists, there is also one for this scenario. Hence we have reached the desired contradiction.
